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no friend of Mr. Spencer—ridiculed our modern educational machinery as one of the marks of a mechanical age, and thought that we were losing our individuality.* Thus we have at least two prophets of evil, sufficiently vociferous, against our modern socialism. But is it so certain that the sense of individual responsibility varies inversely with the sense of national responsibility? And is it so certain that to give every one a fair chance is to foster the worst at the expense of the best? It does not seem to me that Mr. Spencer has proved this.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

ETHICA, OR THE ETHICS OF REASON. By Scotus Novanticus, author of "Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta." Second Edition. London: Williams & Norgate, 1891.

Although this book (now acknowledged to be by Professor Laurie) is nominally a scientific treatise on Ethics, it is largely—in fact, predominantly—concerned with Psychology. And the author would no doubt admit this with readiness, and would justify his treatment by the consideration that the ethical end has to be found by an elaborate examination of man's nature. "The end of every existence is itself" (p. 284), therefore to find out the *end* of man it is necessary to ascertain what man *is*—what *ought to be* being thus determined by reference to what is.

As regards Professor Laurie's psychological view, it seems to me that he has not quite made up his mind whether to prefer the old twofold division of mental phenomena into passive and active, or the later threefold division into cognition, will, and feeling. On the one hand, he appears to recognize reason, volition, and feelings; but on the other, he blends will and reason, contrasting them, as active and formal, with the passivity of feelings. This reduction of will and reason to a kind of confused joint-faculty, of which each seems in turn to produce the other, is at first sight a startling novelty in psychological analysis; it is at the same time the most distinctive feature of the author's psychological scheme. But it comes, I think, to little more than a peculiar way of expressing the analysis of psychical factors into active and passive—as seems tolerably evident when we consider his use of the term *Feeling*, which is applied not only to pain and pleasure, but also to what are frequently called *Sensations*—i.e., psychoses differing from one another in intellectual characteristics, but supposed to resemble each other in that they are passive or recipient. If the "identification" of will with reason does not mean more or other than that in cognition or intellection there is *activity* on the part of the Subject, then I should admit the "identification;" but I think that the truth intended is much better conveyed in the doctrine expounded by Dr. Ward (art. Psychology, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Ninth Edition), where we find attention and volition classed together as the activity of the Subject which *attends* to objects (things, ideas, or movements) presented to it, and *feels* pleasure or pain. This way of looking at the matter

* See especially his Essay on "Signs of the Times." Oddly enough, Carlyle is here at one with the Political Economists also—his great bugbear. See, for instance, Chalmers's "Christian and Civic Economy of Large Towns." It is interesting to compare this with Father Huntington's article on "Philanthropy and Morality," in the October number of this JOURNAL.

has much more applicability to facts and much more explanatory efficacy than schemes which do not explicitly recognize the psychological Subject. And another of its advantages is that it avoids the absurdity of talking about *pure activity* and *pure passivity* as though they were substantial entities of which the one owes its arrangement or "organization" to the other—as a net owes its reticulation to the knots or connections by which the constituent loops are formed and held together. It is evident enough that, in any case we can suppose, where two factors are concerned there must be both activity and passivity on the part of each.

If the identification of will and reason has some different meaning to that above suggested, I am unable to see what it can be, other than the undisputed and indisputable proposition that the faculties of will and reason may be exercised simultaneously. In any case, I think that the phraseology used by Professor Laurie is unfortunate, since it tends to blur the highly important distinction between "undistinguishable resemblance" and "individual identity" (cf. *specie tantum* and *numero tantum*), which has been so clearly explained by the scholastic logicians, by Whately, by Mill, and by Dr. Ward. Yet failure to keep the distinction clear, even to recognize it at all, continues to be a source of confusion; and of this the book before us furnishes illustration.

Professor Laurie "dismisses as the personal property of the Intuitionalist" the expression "moral faculty." He, however, admits a "moral sense"—*i.e.*, "a feeling of the quality and character of feelings and emotions, and therefore of motives of conduct." To speak of will as *free* is in his view "a tautology;" but if, as he affirms, "the freedom of each thing consists in its being truly itself," then, since nothing can ever be anything but itself, the will, like all other things, must be free. But to say that the will is free in this sense, whether or not tautological, is certainly unimportant.

Passing on to the more purely ethical questions, we are told that "the task of the moral philosopher is to find the true good for man." Now, "self-realization for any organism is 'the good' for that organism. Man has to find 'the good' for himself. He is an end to himself." "Self-realization is possible only through the constant presence of the formal (the idea) in the real—of will in feeling, and its perpetual supremacy in that domain. The sovereignty of the 'idea' in man is the supreme end or purpose of his complex existence." "Life in all its fulness and abundance is the self-realization of man,—his function." Man's "specific function . . . is to find the law in himself for himself by himself, and to actualize that law in conduct." "Special excellences of the philosophic and æsthetic life" are "always desirable, and in truth the ultimate and ideal function of man." "The good for man is self-realization. In other words, Man lives to fulfil himself, to develop in activity *all* his powers, and this in their most excellent activity. Altruism is not his end, save in so far as altruism is embraced within the conditions of egoistic completeness." "The *ultimate* function of man . . . is the dominancy of will and personality; free movement of will in knowing and affirming, and free movement of the same will in actualizing its affirmations, *i.e.*, in volition or doing." "The good for man is harmony (which is fulness of life)." Again, we are told that the *chief* good for man is "*Fulness of Life achieved through Law by the action of Will as Reason*

on Sensibility;" and that "the dominancy of will-reason and of the law thence emanating is the *supreme* good for man; because it is the idea of him." And "identity with self is the prime content" of this idea.

As to the relation of self-realization and law, we are told that law is sought as the "*prius* of self-realization." Again, "the only happiness possible for man always *attends on the fulfilment of Law*,"—"it is law in doing which he [man] necessarily seeks." "It is the moral law and duty to it that man seeks." But law is constraint, and, according to Professor Laurie, self-realization, which is the end, is essentially realization of will, which is essentially freedom. However, we will pass over this difficulty (if it is a difficulty).

Supposing realization or organization of self, or fulness of life, or fulfilment of function, to be accepted as the ethical end, how is any man to know when he has attained this end, when (in other words) he has found the law of his organism? "To suppose that there can be any external standard of the law of an organism is absurd,"—the only evidence that it has been found "is in feeling—the feeling of harmony." "Reason . . . must, in its search for law in the sensibility, refer itself ultimately to sensibility, in order that it may know when it has found the law." The self-realization or good of man is "guaranteed by a sense of harmony." "Harmony is the universal and necessary predicate of self-realization or the Good, . . . in conscious beings it must be *felt*," etc. (It is not explained how all this is to be reconciled with a sentence on p. 37: "Feeling in and through reason, *guaranteed by reason* as a system of ends,—this is morality.")

Now, "as the ultimate criterion of the ascertainment of law is a *feeling* of harmony, the ultimate criterion is happiness"—for "a feeling of harmony is happiness." But though this is the criterion,* the end is the law of harmony. However, if nothing more definite is told us about the end, we seem *practically* to be in the position of the hedonist, who accepts happiness or pleasure as end. Indeed, we are actually told, on page 70, that "the end of volition is . . . the *satisfaction* of individual reason itself."

Let us go on to ask what precise ethical guidance is afforded us. Self-realization, under any of the notions suggested, must be acknowledged by any one who has considered the subject to be too vague a conception to be either scientifically or practically useful. Indeed, this seems to be allowed by Professor Laurie himself. For what is the *self* whose realization is spoken of? If it is merely the self that has been, is, or will be (and it appears to be this), the realization of *this* self cannot be an ethical end unless we maintain that *what is* is *what ought to be*—in which case ethics seems superfluous. But if the self is the self that *ought to be*, then of course it is clear that the whole ethical question, *What* is it that ought to be? still remains to be answered.

Perhaps, however, we may get help by turning to the consideration of "finite virtues." We are told that though undoubtedly "the ultimate end of man is life in the ideal" (self-realization), yet the obligation to live the ideal life is less

* Cf., however, p. 187: "The standard is objective: Not what I should *like* to do, but what I *ought* to do while keeping in view the supreme ethical end for all human beings and for society at large;" and p. 287: The idea of a total is "always silently operative in man as an ultimate standard of conduct."

stringent than the obligations to mere temperance and justice, because (p. 195) it is these "finite virtues" which "make life possible, and are the pre-conditions of ideal perfection itself," or (as is elsewhere said) because they are primary, and superior quantitatively. We are, however, provided (also on p. 195) with another reason for the less stringency of obligation of the ideal life as compared with "finite virtues,"—namely, the claims of the ideal life are only self-regarding, whereas the claims of justice concern others as well as self. This seems to be in conflict with the general ethical doctrine of the work, that the end is realization of self; still, that the author means to lay stress upon it is evident from his going on to say, on p. 196, that "when there is a conflict of duties—*i.e.*, a conflict between the ideal life and finite virtues—there can be no doubt where the supreme obligation lies,"—*viz.*, with the finite virtues.

Is precise and adequate guidance to be obtained from a consideration of the virtues of temperance and justice, which are the only finite virtues discussed at any length? Temperance is identified with self-control, and is described as action which considers the future as well as the present of the agent. It is also defined as "appetitive justice," or justice in the region of appetition. Negative justice is said to be "a balance of the altruistic and self-regarding feelings within the man," "the fundamental relation of one person to other persons in community," "the freedom of each citizen to realize himself consistently with the freedom of every other." "The obligation of justice is an obligation of reason, giving the rule to the complex of inner feeling with a view to harmony or non-contradiction."

Positive justice is "a conscious positive desire and effort to help others to realize themselves" (with a certain limitation). Justice generally is "the peace of harmony"—"equality as subject to a higher end than that contained in any particular desire." Justice is "the moral law," "the idea in relations." "In this idea of relations—justice—lies the law of conduct, by which we mean the law of motive; in this lies moral obligation." Justice "embraces all the social virtues" (p. 170); it is "an expression for the *law* of man's inner organism as ascertained by reason."

But we learn later that justice is "an elastic idea;" and that since "the heart of justice is an altruistic emotion," it is "impossible for the term 'justice' to preserve any hard and fast definition."

All this seems to leave us with as little distinct guidance as the notion of self-realization itself; even supposing the difficulty as to the relation between the ideal life and finite virtue to have been cleared up, we find no consistent definite systematic account either of the ideal life itself or of the particular virtues. And to complete our disappointment, we are told at p. 288 that the attainment of self-realization is, for finite beings, "manifestly impossible."

E. E. C. JONES.

ETHIK. Encyklopädische Skizzen u. Literaturangaben zur Sittenlehre. I. PRAKTISCHE ETHIK. Von Georg Runze. Berlin, 1891: Carl Duncker. Pp. viii, 274, 8vo.

The treatise on ethics, which Herr Georg Runze, professor at the University of Berlin, has begun in the volume before us, though at first sight unusual,